Your contacts stay on your device.
In a regular session, the app saves contact names, private invitations and your settings in browser-local storage. It doesn’t upload your address book or create a cloud account.
Local storage is not a password-protected vault. Someone with access to your unlocked browser profile, a compromised device or a malicious script could read it. Use a password-encrypted export when moving contacts between browsers.
Temporary sessions keep contact data in memory instead. Ending or reloading the session clears that app state. This is not forensic erasure of device memory, browser history, clipboard contents or downloaded backups.
Call content is encrypted in transit.
The shared invitation secret protects call setup messages. WebRTC provides DTLS-SRTP encryption for voice media. Default relay-only calls use an operator-configured TURN relay to avoid exposing a direct peer address to the other browser.
A relay and hosting infrastructure can observe network metadata, including addresses and timing. Direct mode can reveal your address to the other participant. Relay-only calls stop if a suitable relay is unavailable; there is no silent switch to Direct mode.
Tiny messages uses encrypted signaling and keeps short notes in memory for up to 90 seconds. Closing the panel clears the local messages. There is no durable offline message queue.
No app-owned contact or call-history database.
The application doesn’t write contacts, recordings, chat content, room history or call logs to server disk. Live routing information exists in memory while connections are active.
This does not mean that no data exists anywhere. Hosting providers, reverse proxies, relay services and network operators may process or retain connection metadata. Their actual policies need to be checked by the deployment operator.
Notifications are an opt-in tradeoff.
Enabling background alerts shares a browser push address and subscription keys with the connection service. These stay in memory for up to 24 hours after renewal and disappear on a server restart. Push providers also process delivery.
Alerts contain a generic call notice rather than a contact name or invitation secret. Delivery is not guaranteed. Browser blocking, battery settings and operating-system restrictions can stop it. iPhone and iPad web push require Home Screen installation.
Microphone access is for voice calls. The app releases its stream when a call finishes. This marketing website never asks for microphone or notification permission.
No magic invisibility claims.
- The other person can record, copy notes or share an invitation.
- A compromised endpoint or application host can undermine encryption.
- Voice effects do not guarantee that a voice is unrecognizable or unrecoverable.
- The custom signaling protocol has not received an independent security audit. No forward-secrecy or formal anonymity guarantee is made.
- Deleting your contact does not revoke other copies of the invitation.
This website stays small, too.
imicall.com is the marketing and documentation site. It is separate from the app at app.imicall.com. This website has no analytics scripts, advertising cookies, newsletter forms or embedded social-media trackers.
Fonts, artwork and the optional product film are served from this site. The film downloads only after you press play. The interactive illustrations are local demos and do not place calls or request permissions.
When you visit an external link or use your device’s share sheet, that destination’s policies apply. The website host still processes ordinary request metadata. The final hosting provider and retention policy must be confirmed before public launch.
See the responsible disclosure guidance. Please don’t publish secrets, private invitations or exploit details in a public issue.