Protect the invitation first.
The private invitation contains a secret used to protect call setup. The secret appears in the URL fragment after the # character, which a browser does not send in the ordinary HTTP request.
This is useful, but it does not make the full link harmless to share. The recipient, a clipboard manager or a messaging service you use to send the link may see it. Anyone with the full invitation may join the connection.
Separate call content from metadata.
ImiCall encrypts signaling with the invitation secret. WebRTC encrypts voice media using DTLS-SRTP. These protections concern the content and setup of a conversation.
An internet connection still has endpoints and timing. The hosting service, your network and a TURN relay can observe metadata. Application code cannot remove infrastructure logs or prevent all traffic analysis.
Understand the relay choice.
The app defaults to relay-only voice transport and removes STUN-only entries from that configuration. It checks for a configured TURN relay before opening the microphone for a protected call.
A functioning relay avoids exchanging direct peer connectivity with the other browser. It is not a general anonymity network. Direct mode is an explicit alternative and may reveal your address to the other participant. If a relay is unavailable, the app does not silently make that choice for you.
Local does not mean locked.
Keeping contacts in your browser avoids a central contact database. In regular mode, however, they are stored in browser-local storage. Someone using your unlocked profile, a compromised extension or injected application script can undermine this protection.
An encrypted export protects the backup file with the password you choose. Temporary sessions reduce contact persistence in the app. Neither promises secure deletion from OS memory, browser history, backups or the clipboard.
The other endpoint is still a person.
The person you call can record the audio with another device. They can copy a note, share an invitation or recognize contextual details in a conversation. Optional voice effects cannot guarantee irreversible anonymity.
The custom signaling protocol has not received an independent security audit. It should not be described as a formally verified anonymity system or a protocol with guaranteed forward secrecy. A compromised device or application host can defeat the intended protections.
Choose what you need, with the limits in view.
Keep invitations out of public posts. Use an updated browser and a device you control. Choose the relay setting knowingly. Back up only what you need, and protect that backup with a strong password.
These are practical ways to reduce exposure. They are not a promise that no one can ever learn that you used the service or who you spoke with.
The ImiCall walkthrough · Privacy, explained · Private setup & pricing · Testing & limitations